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S-money [1] schemes define virtual tokens designed for networks with relativistic or other trusted
signalling constraints. The tokens allow near-instant verification and guarantee unforgeability with-
out requiring quantum state storage. We present refined two stage S-money schemes. The first
stage, which may involve quantum information exchange, generates private user token data. In the
second stage, which need only involve classical communications, users determine the valid presen-
tation point, without revealing it to the issuer. This refinement allows the user to determine the
presentation point anywhere in the causal past of all valid presentation points. It also allows flexible
transfer of tokens among users without compromising user privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Money and other type of tokens allow a user to access
a ressource, while guaranteeing to the issuer that the to-
kens cannot be forged. Quantum money and quantum
token schemes [2–5] can theoretically guarantee unforge-
ability with unconditional security. However, standard
quantum money and quantum token schemes are im-
practical with current technology because they require
long-term quantum state storage. Quantum memories
cannot currently store quantum states reliably for more
than a fraction of a second. Although longer term quan-
tum memories will presumably be developed in future,
it is unclear whether (or when) quantum memory tech-
nology will ever be competitive in price and practicality
with classical alternatives.
S-money [6] schemes [1, 7–9] offer alternatives to quan-
tum money that do not require quantum memory and can
respond more flexibly to generalized summoning tasks
[1]. However, many other theoretical and practical ques-
tions about the relative advantages, implementability
and resource costs of S-money and quantum money to-
ken schemes remain to be addressed. In our view, both
technologies are potentially promising and merit further
refinement and development.
In this paper we describe refinements of S-money
schemes that improve their flexibility and transferabil-
ity. We focus on a single round implementation of a sim-
ple quantum S-money token scheme in order to illustrate
the essential ideas; it is straightforward to extend these
to multiple rounds, to other types of S-money token, to
schemes involving subtokens and to more complex sce-
narios. We also simplify the discussion by focusing on
an S-money scheme that guarantees unforgeability and
future privacy for the user, without the extra crypto-
graphic layer required to ensure past privacy; again, the
extension is straightforward.
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II. FLEXIBLE S-MONEY
We follow the standard scenario for S-money [1]. The
issuer (Bob the bank) consists of a network of local
agents based at secure sites, with authenticated and se-
cure communication links, working in collaboration and
with mutual trust. Similarly, the user (Alice the ac-
quirer) consists of a network of local agents based at se-
cure sites, with authenticated and secure communication
links, working in collaboration and with mutual trust.
The user and issuer agree to implement the scheme but
do not trust one another to behave honestly. The user’s
secure sites do not overlap with the issuer’s. The user
and issuer agree on a reference frame, where spacetime
coordinates are defined. The user and issuer agree in
advance on a set of presentation points Qi, where the
user can present an S-money token to the issuer in order
to access a resource. The scheme begins at some start
point P with P ≺ Qi (that is, P is in the causal past of
Qi) for all i. To be precise, both P and the Qi actually
represent localized spacetime regions containing separate
secure sites for the user and issuer, with a time window
allowing prescribed communications between these sites.
Because the spatial and/or temporal separations between
these regions are large (in the relevant rest frame) com-
pared to those of the regions, we can think of them as
effectively points on a spacetime network. The token
scheme is initiated by classical and/or quantum informa-
tion communications between user and issuer agents at
P . To consider transferability of tokens we refer to two or
more users (Alice1, Alice2, . . .). In this case each user has
their own separate secure site at each relevant network
point.
A. Bit-string coordination and S-money schemes
These schemes are based on bit-string coordination [1]
protocols between the user and issuer. Bit-string coordi-
nation is an intrinsically relativistic task in which the user
inputs, or commits, a string b at some point in spacetime,
2and later unveils by giving classical data to the issuer to
show that her input was b. A secure implementation
of bit-string coordination satisfies two security proper-
ties: binding and hiding. We say a protocol is binding
if it guarantees to the issuer that if the user successfully
proves having input b then she cannot also prove (either
at the same spacetime point or elsewhere) having input a
different string b′. We say a protocol is hiding if it guar-
antees to the user that the issuer cannot know b until it
is unveiled by the user. Bit-string coordination is similar
to but weaker than bit-string commitment, which also
needs to guarantee to the issuer that the user committed
to her input at some specified start point. In this pa-
per we apply the language of bit-string commitment to
bit-string coordination, as specified above.
In the S-money schemes [1, 7] we consider here, the
user defines their bit string by choices of measurements
on quantum states sent by the issuer. The schemes and
our refinements are secure regardless of the user’s techno-
logical limitations. However, to simplify the discussion,
we will assume the user is technologically limited and
has no quantum state storage, which effectively forces
her to carry out these measurements on receipt. Given
this limitation, the bit string coordination protocol effec-
tively becomes a bit string commitment protocol, with
the commitment being made when the states are mea-
sured. Specifically, the commitment phase for each bit
in the string is that of the BB84 bit commitment pro-
tocol of Ref. [10], whose security was analysed in Refs.
[10–13]. This protocol was implemented experimentally
[13] with a modification involving precommitment to a
random string in order to allow practical implementa-
tion without requiring long distance quantum commu-
nication. This technique was used also used in practi-
cal protocols for spacetime-constrained oblivious transfer
[14, 15]. We use variations on this idea here.
B. Limitations of previous S-money schemes
To generate an S-money token by this protocol, the
issuer needs to send a string of quantum states to the user
at the start point. In the ideal version, these states are
pure qubits drawn randomly from the four BB84 states,
sent along a lossless channel, and the user carries out
perfect BB84 basis measurements on each state. The
sequence of BB84 basis measurements chosen determines
her choice of commitment string b.
In practical embodiments with photonic systems, this
quantum communication step involves generating a se-
quence of weak photon pulses, with some errors in the
polarizations chosen, some losses, and some measurement
errors. Depending on the experimental parameters, a
reasonable level of security may require the transmission
and measurement of a large number of photon pulses,
which could take at least a few seconds. In an S-money
scheme, this would require the user to choose her presen-
tation point Qb at least a few seconds in the past of Qb.
This is a significant and undesirable limitation, since S-
money schemes are intended for application in relativistic
scenarios where time is critical and where decisions about
when and where to present the S-money are ideally made
as flexibly as possible (and in particular as late as pos-
sible) on the basis of incoming information received at
various spacetime points.
C. Flexible S-money schemes
In this paper, we propose a more flexible way of im-
plementing S-money. We suppose that users may realise
they may potentially want to acquire and use S-money
well in advance of actually doing so. This seems gener-
ally realistic. For example, traders who plan high value
high speed trades on the global financial network expect
to be registered, authenticated, licensed, to set up infras-
tructure, and so on, before they begin trading: they do
not expect to be able to show up on the network unan-
nounced and uncredentialled and instantly trade.
We thus propose that users go through information
exchanges with the bank well before they acquire or use
S-money. These exchanges effectively define bit string
commitments to long random strings x. The bank’s data
from each user’s commitment is shared with all the bank’s
local agents, but kept private from other users.
To acquire an S-money token, a user needs only to
communicate classically with the bank at some point PA.
They first agree a set of valid presentation points {Qi :
i ∈ S}. Here S satisfies 2M−1 < |S| ≤ 2M , eachQi  PA,
and they agree a convention for the labeling of the Qi by
bit strings i (which may be standard). They also agree
which previously unused lengthM segment x of the user’s
committed bit string will be associated with this token,
by labeling the relevant bits. (The user keeps the value
of x secret here.) They may also at this point agree the
price to be paid (e.g. in some standard currency) for the
S-money token, and perhaps process the payment. The
bank’s local agent sends all the information received to
the bank’s agents at each Qi.
The user may then decide where the token will be valid,
and commit to this decision by choosing b ∈ S, at any
network point PD such that PA  PD  Qi for all i ∈ S.
The user’s local agent at PD commits this to the bank’s
local agent by sending him the string m = x⊕ b, and the
bank’s local agent sends this to the bank’s agents at each
Qi, where ‘⊕’ denotes sum modulo two.
Finally, at Qb, the user’s local agent unveils the com-
mitment to x by sending their commitment data to the
bank’s local agent. The bank’s local agent verifies the
commitment and thatm⊕x = b; if these tests are passed,
the S-money token is validated at Qb, and the user is
given whatever resources were agreed there.
31. Example
In the token scheme presented in Ref. [7] the issuer
transmits a quantum state |Ψ〉 to the user, chosen from
a predetermined set. At reception of |Ψ〉, the user chooses
the number b labeling the presentation point Qb by ap-
plying on |Ψ〉 a quantum measurement Mb that belongs
to a predetermined set, obtaining a classical measure-
ment outcome y.[16] The user presents the token at Qb
by presenting the classical measurement outcome y at
Qb. The issuer validates the token at Qb if he verifies
that the data y received from the user at Qb correspond
to a statistically plausible measurement outcome of the
quantum measurement Mb applied on |Ψ〉.
The following example to implement the previous to-
ken scheme is given in Ref. [7]. Let the presentation
points be labeled by M−bit strings, for an integer M
predetermined by the user and issuer. Let |Ψr,s〉 =⊗
(k,l)∈[M ]×[n]
∣∣∣φs
k
l
rk
l
〉
, where r = (r1, . . . , rn) with rl =
(r1l , . . . , r
M
l ), and s = (s1, . . . , sn) with sl = (s
1
l , . . . , s
M
l ),
and with rkl , s
k
l ∈ {0, 1}, for k ∈ [M ] and l ∈ [n], and
where |φ00〉 = |0〉, |φ
0
1〉 = |1〉, |φ
1
0〉 = |+〉 and |φ
1
1〉 = |−〉,
where n is a predetermined positive integer that acts as
a security parameter, where {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} is the set
of Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) states, where |±〉 =
1√
2
(
|0〉 ± |1〉
)
and where the states |0〉 and |1〉 are or-
thonormal. The issuer generates a state |Ψ〉 = |Ψr,s〉 of
nM qubits, with r and s chosen randomly from {0, 1}Mn,
and sends |Ψ〉 to the user. The issuer sends the labels
(k, l) of the transmitted qubits, for k ∈ [M ] and l ∈ [n].
Let b = (b1, . . . , bM ) ∈ {0, 1}
M be the string that la-
bels the user’s chosen presentation point Qb. The user’s
measurement Mb consist in measuring the received qubit
with label (k, l) in the computational basis ({|0〉, |1〉}) if
bk = 0 or in the Hadamard basis ({|+〉, |−〉}) if bk = 1,
respectively, for l ∈ [n] and for k ∈ [M ].
In our flexible S-money scheme, at reception of the to-
ken from the issuer, the user applies the quantum mea-
surement Mx on the quantum state |Ψ〉 received from the
issuer, where x is a random M−bit string chosen by the
user. The user obtains a classical measurement outcome
y. Then, the user chooses the M− bit string b labeling
her presentation point Qb and sends m = x ⊕ b to the
issuer at a point in the causal future of the point where
she completed the measurement Mx and within the inter-
section of the causal pasts of all the presentation points.
The user gives the token y to the issuer at Qb. The
issuer validates the token if he verifies that y is a statis-
tically plausible measurement outcome of the quantum
measurement Mm⊕b applied to |Ψ〉. This is illustrated in
Fig. 1 below.
FIG. 1. Our flexible S-money scheme described in the main
text is illustrated in 1 + 1-dimensional Minkowski spacetime.
The presentation points Qi are shown (black dots). The black
lines denote light rays. Bob’s transmission of the quantum
state |Ψ〉 to Alice is illustrated with the large maroon diago-
nal arrow. Alice’s generation of the random string x and her
output classical measurement outcome y, obtained by apply-
ing the measurement Mx on the received quantum state, are
illustrated with blue vertical arrows. Alice’s choice of the
presentation point Qb is illustrated with another blue vertical
arrow. Alice’s transmission of the classical message m = x⊕b
to Bob is illustrated with the red diagonal arrow. The trans-
mission of the token consists in Alice giving her measurement
outcome y to Bob at Qb (green diagonal arrow).
D. Security of flexible S-money schemes
1. Unforgeability
A refined S-money scheme based on a bit-string coor-
dination protocol that is binding satisfies the property of
unforgeability, according to which the user cannot have
two or more tokens validated at two or more presenta-
tion points, as we discuss. In a cheating strategy by the
user trying to present tokens at two different presentation
points Qi1 and Qi2 , the user must be able to present un-
veiling data that corresponds to a valid commitment to a
number x1, satisfying m⊕ x1 = i1, and also to a number
x2, satisfying m ⊕ x2 = i2. Since i1 6= i2, we have that
x1 6= x2. However, if the bit-string coordination pro-
tocol is binding then, by definition, if the user presents
unveiling data that corresponds to a valid commitment
to a number x1 then the user cannot also present unveil-
ing data that corresponds to a valid commitment to a
number x2 6= x1. Thus, the property of unforgeability
follows.
42. Future privacy for the user
A refined S-money scheme based on a bit-string coor-
dination protocol that is hiding and where x is chosen
randomly and securely by the user satisfies the property
of future privacy for the user, according to which the
issuer cannot obtain any information about the presen-
tation point Qb chosen by the user before the token is
presented by the user, as we discuss. In a cheating strat-
egy by the issuer trying to obtain some information about
the number b labeling the presentation point Qb chosen
by the user, the issuer may try to learn some informa-
tion about the number x to which the user commits at
the reception of the token in the bit-string coordination
protocol and use this obtained information together with
the message m = x⊕ b received from the user to obtain
some information about b. However, if we assume that
the bit-string coordination protocol is hiding then, by
definition, the issuer cannot know the value of x before
it is unveiled by the user. Therefore, assuming that x
is chosen randomly and securely by the user, the issuer
cannot obtain any information about b from the message
m = x⊕ b, before x is unveiled by the user. Thus, future
privacy for the user follows.
III. TRANSFERRING S-MONEY TOKENS
Our refinement allows S-money tokens to be traded
and transferred between users quite simply and flexibly.
Suppose the first user A1 has acquired a token at point
P , associated with her committed bit string x1, and now
wishes to transfer it to a second user A2 at point PT ,
where P  PT  Qi for all i. In the simplest version,
A1’s local agent at PT simply gives A2’s local agent all
the data defining the labels of the presentation points in
S, and an authenticated digitally signed message trans-
ferring her rights in the token. A2 verifies this message
and registers the transfer with the bank’s local agent,
agreeing to associate to the token a labeled segment x2
of A2’s precommitted random string. The local agents of
A1 and A2 may also at this point agree the price to be
paid (e.g. in some standard currency) for the S-money
token transfer, and perhaps process the payment. The
bank’s local agent notifies all agents at points Qi of the
transfer and of the labeled string segment.
Now A2 may decide the valid presentation point Qb at
any point PD such that PT  PD  Qi for all i, and
commit to this by sending the string m2 = x2 ⊕ b to
Bob. She may present the token at Qb by sending all
the commitment data for x2 (which comes from her own
commitments) to Bob’s local agent there. Bob’s local
agent validates both commitments, and accepts the token
if the commitments are validly unveiled and m2⊕x2 = b.
Alternatively, instead of deciding a presentation point,
A2 may transfer the token to A3 at some transfer point
PT ′  PT by sending all the relevant data and her own
authenticated digitally signed transfer message, and so
on.
Each user Ai is guaranteed future privacy regarding
their token presentation point, since when they commit
to the valid presentation point Qb at some point PD they
send a stringmi = xi⊕b, where xi is a committed private
random string.
IV. DELAYING THE CHOICE OF
PRESENTATION POINT
This technique extends to allow the user to make a se-
quence of decisions and commitments at separate points
in spacetime that collectively decide the presentation
point, while still guaranteeing to the issuer that there
can be no more than one valid presentation point.
Let PDi for i = 1, . . . , N be a set of decision points,
with at least one of them, PD1 , in the causal past of all
valid presentation points. Let {Qi : i ∈ S} be the set
of presentation points. The user may decide and commit
at PD1 to restrict the valid presentation point to lie in a
subset {Qi : i ∈ S1}, sending the issuer a description of
the subset S1 committed using data from their precom-
mitted random string x. Let PD2 lie in the causal past
of all Qi with i ∈ S1. The user may decide and commit
at PD2 to restrict the valid presentation point to lie in a
subset {Qi : i ∈ S2}, sending the issuer a description of
the subset S2 ⊂ S1 committed using further data from
their precommitted random string, and so on, with the
valid presentation point finally decided and committed
to at (or before) the final point PDm .
These commitments may be coded efficiently if the con-
figuration of the decision points and the sizes and rela-
tions of the relevant subsets are suitable and known in
advance. For example, if it is known in advance that a
binary choice will be made at each successive decision
point, selecting one of two equally sized known subsets,
then the user may simply commit using successive bits
of the string x that would have been used to commit
directly to b in the unrefined protocol.
A. Example
In Fig. 2, we illustrate a simple example with eight
presentation points Qi, with i ∈ S = {0, 1}
3, and two
decision points, N = 2. Let i = (i1, i2, i3) ∈ {0, 1}
3
with i1, i2, i3 ∈ {0, 1}, for i ∈ {x, b}. D1 ≡ PD1 is
a spacetime point within the intersection of the causal
pasts of all the presentation points, where Alice decides
that her presentation point Qb will belong to the set
{Qb100, Qb101, Qb110, Qb111}, i.e. with S1 =
{(
b1, i2, i3) :
i2, i3 ∈ {0, 1}}, and with b1 = 0 in this example. At D1,
Alice indicates to Bob that she has chosen her presenta-
tion point to have the bit b1 fixed, without telling him the
chosen value for b1, and sends him the bit m1 = x1 ⊕ b1,
where x1 is the first bit of the previously committed
string x = (x1, x2, x3). At the decision point D2 ≡ PD2 ,
5FIG. 2. The refinement allowing Alice to delay her chosen
presentation point described in the main text is illustrated
in 1 + 1-dimensional Minkowski spacetime. In this example,
there are eight presentation points (black dots). The black
lines denote light rays. Alice has spacetime decision points,
D1 and D2 (maroon dots). D1 is in the causal past of all the
presentation points. D2 is in the causal past of Q0i2i3 , for all
i2, i3 ∈ {0, 1}. Alice’s choices for the bit entries of the label
b = (b1, b2, b3) = (0, 1, 0) of her chosen presentation point Qb
are illustrated with the blue vertical arrows. The bit m1 =
x1 ⊕ b1 and the two-bit string (m2,m3) = (x2, x3) ⊕ (b2, b3)
that Alice sends Bob at D1 andD2, respectively, are indicated
by the red diagonal arrows. Presentation of the token by Alice
to Bob at Qb consists in Alice unveiling her three bit string x
to Bob at the presentation point Qb, as illustrated with the
green diagonal arrow. An alternative decision point, D′2, is
also shown. Alice may use this if she chooses b1 = 1 at D1.
which is in the causal past of all Qi with i ∈ S1, Alice
chooses the bits b2 and b3 of her presentation point Qb,
with values b2 = 1 and b3 = 0 in this example, she indi-
cates to Bob that she has chosen her presentation point
and sends the two-bit string (m2,m3) = (x2, x3)⊕(b2, b3)
to Bob. Alice presents her token at Qb by unveiling
to Bob’s agent at Qb her commitment to the string x.
Bob’s agent at Qb validates Alice’s token at Qb, with
b = (b1, b2, b3), if he validates Alice’s commitment to x
and if mi ⊕ xi = bi for i = 1, 2, 3.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have presented refinements of S-money
schemes introduced in Refs. [1, 7–9]. These refinements
make the schemes considerably more flexible and practi-
cal. They allow the initial commitment phase, which in-
volves quantum communications and measurements and
potentially may be relatively lengthy, to take place long
in advance. This allows the user to choose her presen-
tation point at potentially any point in the intersection
of the causal pasts of all the presentation points, lim-
ited only by the need to complete the commitment by
relatively short classical communications. It also allows
the user to make a series of decisions, which may be in-
dependent, that collectively determine the presentation
point. This flexibility is valuable in applications where
speed is critical. Further, it allows S-money tokens to
be simply and efficiently transferred between users. The
refinements retain the properties of unforgeability and fu-
ture user privacy, both for the original user and for users
to whom the token is transferred.
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